Comments on: G.A. Cohen RIP http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/ What Is The Third Estate? Everything. What Has It Been Until Now In The Political Order? Nothing. What Does It Want To Be? Something. Wed, 08 Feb 2012 20:19:31 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1.1 By: Chris Horner http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-13124 Chris Horner Fri, 30 Apr 2010 11:00:32 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-13124 If anyone is looking for a recent defence of the dialectic check out Frederic Jameson's 'Valences of the Dialectic'. Its a door-stop of a book but you might want to look at the long opening chapter, which is an extended examination and evaluation of what 'dialectic'/'dialectical' might mean to us today. If anyone is looking for a recent defence of the dialectic check out Frederic Jameson’s ‘Valences of the Dialectic’. Its a door-stop of a book but you might want to look at the long opening chapter, which is an extended examination and evaluation of what ‘dialectic’/'dialectical’ might mean to us today.

]]> By: Pabs http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3565 Pabs Sat, 15 Aug 2009 00:42:01 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3565 This is interesting. I come to know a revered Marxist philosopher only when he's dead. Why not before in the last 20 years when Marxism was in retreat? In my view the worst thing that could happen to society is if the social discoveries of Marx are allowed to die withe the Soviet Union experiment. Let's face it. They blew it. But the crucial element here is that we would not have seen the changes in the XX Century had it not been for the costant nagging of Marx and Engels. If we allow this then the future will be chiseled not in the profile of Marx but of Friedman, Thatcher, Reagan, Paulson, Bernanke and others. That solution ended up with the war in Iraq and the credit crunch. This is interesting. I come to know a revered Marxist philosopher only when he’s dead. Why not before in the last 20 years when Marxism was in retreat? In my view the worst thing that could happen to society is if the social discoveries of Marx are allowed to die withe the Soviet Union experiment. Let’s face it. They blew it. But the crucial element here is that we would not have seen the changes in the XX Century had it not been for the costant nagging of Marx and Engels. If we allow this then the future will be chiseled not in the profile of Marx but of Friedman, Thatcher, Reagan, Paulson, Bernanke and others. That solution ended up with the war in Iraq and the credit crunch.

]]> By: Luke http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3484 Luke Sun, 09 Aug 2009 17:42:17 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3484 But is it a significant re-interpretation? It seems to me that the dialectic is a dispensable component of Marx's thought, partly because it doesn't seem clear what the dialectic is. In any case, reinterpretation is necessary if the dialectic is flawed. So, I can hold, absent some justification of the dialectic, that Cohen merely trims the flawed parts of the theoretical beard of Marx, so to speak! Shaping up what someone thought and making it more rigorous might involve going beyond what they said, but it might be necessary. But is it a significant re-interpretation? It seems to me that the dialectic is a dispensable component of Marx’s thought, partly because it doesn’t seem clear what the dialectic is. In any case, reinterpretation is necessary if the dialectic is flawed. So, I can hold, absent some justification of the dialectic, that Cohen merely trims the flawed parts of the theoretical beard of Marx, so to speak! Shaping up what someone thought and making it more rigorous might involve going beyond what they said, but it might be necessary.

]]> By: Dan http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3481 Dan Sun, 09 Aug 2009 15:16:39 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3481 Luke, I wasn't trying to pretend that Cohen didn't get Hegel. But I don't think what I'm pointing to is just an analogy, rather it is to show that Marx was a Hegelian, and used a similar philosophical method. I think offering an exegesis of Marx that avoids or disavows the value of the fact that Marx used this philosophical method is a re-interpretation of Marx. It's not heresy, and as I think the piece made clear, I have some respect for it, but I do think it involves more than just making him more rigourous. Luke, I wasn’t trying to pretend that Cohen didn’t get Hegel. But I don’t think what I’m pointing to is just an analogy, rather it is to show that Marx was a Hegelian, and used a similar philosophical method.
I think offering an exegesis of Marx that avoids or disavows the value of the fact that Marx used this philosophical method is a re-interpretation of Marx. It’s not heresy, and as I think the piece made clear, I have some respect for it, but I do think it involves more than just making him more rigourous.

]]> By: Luke http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3479 Luke Sun, 09 Aug 2009 14:00:39 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3479 "I think this is a leap too far. In that actually no, dialectic doesn’t need to be justified in the same way as an analytic argument does." What do you mean by an analytic argument? All I mean is that dialectic needs to be justified. There are standards of justification governed by logic and by the reasoning we employ to assess arguments. And any attempt to show that dialectic admits of some special justification apart from these standards you give me will also be subject to those standards! "Probably the best I can do to pin down this thorny theoretical issue is to point you to what is one of the main disagreements here – that is the critical philosopher’s argument that ontology and ethics/pragmatics are one and the same, or at least inseparable." What does it mean to say that ontology and ethics/pragmatics are one and the same? Ontology is the study of what exists, and what entities are; how they are made up, persist and relate to one another. Do you mean Ontology in a Heideggerean sense, as the study of 'being', whatever that means? Ethics is the study of what humans ought to do, and the study of the nature of values and their relation to the former. Take the first kind of Ontology above. How can the study of what exists, of the 'is' (to put a Humean gloss on it), be 'one and the same' as the study of the 'ought' (what humans ought to do)? To know what ought to be done one must know what is, or something about what is. That's the only connection I see. "This leaves a big problem for analytic philosophers – I have to admit I don’t entirely know what they’ve done to explain it, and some seem rather content with just throwing it out. Unfortunately analytic philosophy also presupposes a number of things that dialecticians take issue with: 1) Truth can be expressed straightforwardly in language; 2) The truth of the world is presented to us in a positive fashion; 3) arguments are right or wrong, good or bad, outside of the context of history; etc." Don't lump all 'analytic' philosophers together. I doubt you can say that analytic philosophy presupposes anything. Quite the contrary. Most Analytic philosophers try to question everything and the things they don't will be taken as minor presuppositions. Certainly, not all analytic philosophers think truth could be expressed straightforwardly in language (Wittgenstein, for example). But to assume it can't would be to posit a truth itself that can be expressed straightforwardly in language, which therefore underlies the assumption that truth can't be expressed straightforwardly in language, unless that statement itself is the only truth that can be expressed straightforwardly in language! I don't know what you mean by saying analytic philosophers assume "The truth of the world is presented to us in a positive fashion". If you mean that the said philosophers believe that the truth lies on the surface somehow, that is ludicrous, for clearly the truth has to be found, and the search is often difficult. As for the 'arguments are right or wrong, good or bad, outside of the context of history, etc'. Another self-refuting claim. The negation of that belief itself is taken to be true outside the context of history, etc, and if not, then we have no reason to believe it, as opposed to its converse. The rationality point can't really be settled absent some definition of rationality. I use rational to refer to the cognitive features that distinguish humans from animals. These are transhistorical in extent. One could use 'rational' to mean the standards of justification appropriate to support a thesis or undermine it. To believe these standards are historically relative, again, would be self-reuting. “I think this is a leap too far. In that actually no, dialectic doesn’t need to be justified in the same way as an analytic argument does.”
What do you mean by an analytic argument? All I mean is that dialectic needs to be justified. There are standards of justification governed by logic and by the reasoning we employ to assess arguments. And any attempt to show that dialectic admits of some special justification apart from these standards you give me will also be subject to those standards!
“Probably the best I can do to pin down this thorny theoretical issue is to point you to what is one of the main disagreements here – that is the critical philosopher’s argument that ontology and ethics/pragmatics are one and the same, or at least inseparable.”
What does it mean to say that ontology and ethics/pragmatics are one and the same? Ontology is the study of what exists, and what entities are; how they are made up, persist and relate to one another. Do you mean Ontology in a Heideggerean sense, as the study of ‘being’, whatever that means?
Ethics is the study of what humans ought to do, and the study of the nature of values and their relation to the former. Take the first kind of Ontology above. How can the study of what exists, of the ‘is’ (to put a Humean gloss on it), be ‘one and the same’ as the study of the ‘ought’ (what humans ought to do)? To know what ought to be done one must know what is, or something about what is. That’s the only connection I see.

“This leaves a big problem for analytic philosophers – I have to admit I don’t entirely know what they’ve done to explain it, and some seem rather content with just throwing it out. Unfortunately analytic philosophy also presupposes a number of things that dialecticians take issue with: 1) Truth can be expressed straightforwardly in language; 2) The truth of the world is presented to us in a positive fashion; 3) arguments are right or wrong, good or bad, outside of the context of history; etc.”

Don’t lump all ‘analytic’ philosophers together. I doubt you can say that analytic philosophy presupposes anything. Quite the contrary. Most Analytic philosophers try to question everything and the things they don’t will be taken as minor presuppositions. Certainly, not all analytic philosophers think truth could be expressed straightforwardly in language (Wittgenstein, for example). But to assume it can’t would be to posit a truth itself that can be expressed straightforwardly in language, which therefore underlies the assumption that truth can’t be expressed straightforwardly in language, unless that statement itself is the only truth that can be expressed straightforwardly in language! I don’t know what you mean by saying analytic philosophers assume “The truth of the world is presented to us in a positive fashion”. If you mean that the said philosophers believe that the truth lies on the surface somehow, that is ludicrous, for clearly the truth has to be found, and the search is often difficult. As for the ‘arguments are right or wrong, good or bad, outside of the context of history, etc’. Another self-refuting claim. The negation of that belief itself is taken to be true outside the context of history, etc, and if not, then we have no reason to believe it, as opposed to its converse.

The rationality point can’t really be settled absent some definition of rationality. I use rational to refer to the cognitive features that distinguish humans from animals. These are transhistorical in extent. One could use ‘rational’ to mean the standards of justification appropriate to support a thesis or undermine it. To believe these standards are historically relative, again, would be self-reuting.

]]> By: Luke http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3478 Luke Sun, 09 Aug 2009 13:39:56 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3478 "The point, I think, is that you cannot understand Marx without understanding Hegel. You cannot understand the structure of some of his arguments, and the depth of his claims without understanding the origins of his thought" Cohen did understand and respect Hegel. "the relationship between the ‘forces of production’ and ‘class struggle’ in Historical Materialism is structurally similar (and arguably derived from) the relationship between the Spirit and human passions in Hegel’s philosophy of history...But any attempt to ’systematize’ Marx which involves ignoring or excising this is not merely ‘tidying up’ Marx, it is re-interpreting him" But I doubt Cohen would deny what is at best an analogy you pointed to, and Cohen certainly draws many analogies between Hegel's ideas in the Phenomenology and Marx's ideas. Ignoring or excising an analogy is hardly distorting a thought or misrepresenting it/ What is important is the content of the thought, not whether it bears some sort of analogy to some other thought. “The point, I think, is that you cannot understand Marx without understanding Hegel. You cannot understand the structure of some of his arguments, and the depth of his claims without understanding the origins of his thought”
Cohen did understand and respect Hegel.

“the relationship between the ‘forces of production’ and ‘class struggle’ in Historical Materialism is structurally similar (and arguably derived from) the relationship between the Spirit and human passions in Hegel’s philosophy of history…But any attempt to ’systematize’ Marx which involves ignoring or excising this is not merely ‘tidying up’ Marx, it is re-interpreting him”
But I doubt Cohen would deny what is at best an analogy you pointed to, and Cohen certainly draws many analogies between Hegel’s ideas in the Phenomenology and Marx’s ideas. Ignoring or excising an analogy is hardly distorting a thought or misrepresenting it/ What is important is the content of the thought, not whether it bears some sort of analogy to some other thought.

]]> By: Dan http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3473 Dan Sun, 09 Aug 2009 09:46:07 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3473 Ah, clearly Jacob and I wrote our posts at the same time. Don't construe my comment as 'shut up about the dialectic', cos the conversation just got interesting! Ah, clearly Jacob and I wrote our posts at the same time. Don’t construe my comment as ‘shut up about the dialectic’, cos the conversation just got interesting!

]]> By: Dan http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3472 Dan Sun, 09 Aug 2009 09:40:14 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3472 Actually, let's leave aside the word dialectic, because for some people it seems to get them very worked up. The point, I think, is that you cannot understand Marx without understanding Hegel. You cannot understand the structure of some of his arguments, and the depth of his claims without understanding the origins of his thought. To take the example I use in the piece, the relationship between the 'forces of production' and 'class struggle' in Historical Materialism is structurally similar (and arguably derived from) the relationship between the Spirit and human passions in Hegel's philosophy of history. Of course, Luke is quite right, this doesn't tell you if Marx is correct. But any attempt to 'systematize' Marx which involves ignoring or excising this is not merely 'tidying up' Marx, it is re-interpreting him. Furthermore, I think this makes Marx's theory far weaker. So in that sense I don't think Cohen's work is distinguished merely by its rigour, I think he's actually involved in a re-interpretation. Peter's point about Cohen's attitude to Marx's mottoes and aphorisms is interesting. I actually tend towards the other direction, that these famous lines are the skeleton around which we have to construct any interpretation of Marx, and as such are vital. For example, the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach is a profound philosophical statement, not a catty dig. Actually, let’s leave aside the word dialectic, because for some people it seems to get them very worked up. The point, I think, is that you cannot understand Marx without understanding Hegel. You cannot understand the structure of some of his arguments, and the depth of his claims without understanding the origins of his thought. To take the example I use in the piece, the relationship between the ‘forces of production’ and ‘class struggle’ in Historical Materialism is structurally similar (and arguably derived from) the relationship between the Spirit and human passions in Hegel’s philosophy of history. Of course, Luke is quite right, this doesn’t tell you if Marx is correct. But any attempt to ‘systematize’ Marx which involves ignoring or excising this is not merely ‘tidying up’ Marx, it is re-interpreting him. Furthermore, I think this makes Marx’s theory far weaker. So in that sense I don’t think Cohen’s work is distinguished merely by its rigour, I think he’s actually involved in a re-interpretation.

Peter’s point about Cohen’s attitude to Marx’s mottoes and aphorisms is interesting. I actually tend towards the other direction, that these famous lines are the skeleton around which we have to construct any interpretation of Marx, and as such are vital. For example, the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach is a profound philosophical statement, not a catty dig.

]]> By: Jacob http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3471 Jacob Sun, 09 Aug 2009 09:36:25 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3471 "If that is the case then the dialectic must be justified and the justification would be through some valid argument which meets certain standards of analytical rigour and precision" I think this is a leap too far. In that actually no, dialectic doesn't need to be justified in the same way as an analytic argument does. Yes, it requires justification in some form, but what you are missing is that dialectic is the mode of thought of a /critical/ philosophy. Probably the best I can do to pin down this thorny theoretical issue is to point you to what is one of the main disagreements here - that is the critical philosopher's argument that ontology and ethics/pragmatics are one and the same, or at least inseparable. This leaves a big problem for analytic philosophers - I have to admit I don't entirely know what they've done to explain it, and some seem rather content with just throwing it out. Unfortunately analytic philosophy also presupposes a number of things that dialecticians take issue with: 1) Truth can be expressed straightforwardly in language; 2) The truth of the world is presented to us in a positive fashion; 3) arguments are right or wrong, good or bad, outside of the context of history; etc. If we thought we could explain the world adequately with analytic thinking then we could throw away dialectical thought. I quite like how Adorno puts it, "dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction." "Another quick point. Big, big, big mistake to suppose that Analytic philosophy employs a method (I doubt it can be said to do so) that is an example of the ‘rationality of bourgeois life and thought’. That would need a very convincing argument, and is irrelevant to whether the methods (or the hypothetical method of analytical philosophers) of analytic philosophers ensure the truth of their philosophy" I'm not sure if I've answered this already, needless to say, rationality isn't some transhistorical/transcendent test that churns out right or wrong answers. Rather it /is/ a function of bourgeois thought, and more precisely of bourgeois science (in the old meaning of the word.) And it is entirely relevant to whether analytic philosophers ensure the 'truth' of their philosophy. “If that is the case then the dialectic must be justified and the justification would be through some valid argument which meets certain standards of analytical rigour and precision”

I think this is a leap too far. In that actually no, dialectic doesn’t need to be justified in the same way as an analytic argument does. Yes, it requires justification in some form, but what you are missing is that dialectic is the mode of thought of a /critical/ philosophy. Probably the best I can do to pin down this thorny theoretical issue is to point you to what is one of the main disagreements here – that is the critical philosopher’s argument that ontology and ethics/pragmatics are one and the same, or at least inseparable. This leaves a big problem for analytic philosophers – I have to admit I don’t entirely know what they’ve done to explain it, and some seem rather content with just throwing it out. Unfortunately analytic philosophy also presupposes a number of things that dialecticians take issue with: 1) Truth can be expressed straightforwardly in language; 2) The truth of the world is presented to us in a positive fashion; 3) arguments are right or wrong, good or bad, outside of the context of history; etc. If we thought we could explain the world adequately with analytic thinking then we could throw away dialectical thought. I quite like how Adorno puts it, “dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction.”

“Another quick point. Big, big, big mistake to suppose that Analytic philosophy employs a method (I doubt it can be said to do so) that is an example of the ‘rationality of bourgeois life and thought’. That would need a very convincing argument, and is irrelevant to whether the methods (or the hypothetical method of analytical philosophers) of analytic philosophers ensure the truth of their philosophy”

I’m not sure if I’ve answered this already, needless to say, rationality isn’t some transhistorical/transcendent test that churns out right or wrong answers. Rather it /is/ a function of bourgeois thought, and more precisely of bourgeois science (in the old meaning of the word.) And it is entirely relevant to whether analytic philosophers ensure the ‘truth’ of their philosophy.

]]> By: Luke http://thethirdestate.net/2009/08/g-a-cohen-rip/comment-page-1/#comment-3468 Luke Sun, 09 Aug 2009 02:57:31 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=1523#comment-3468 Another quick point. Big, big, big mistake to suppose that Analytic philosophy employs a method (I doubt it can be said to do so) that is an example of the 'rationality of bourgeois life and thought'. That would need a very convincing argument, and is irrelevant to whether the methods (or the hypothetical method of analytical philosophers) of analytic philosophers ensure the truth of their philosophy. Another quick point. Big, big, big mistake to suppose that Analytic philosophy employs a method (I doubt it can be said to do so) that is an example of the ‘rationality of bourgeois life and thought’. That would need a very convincing argument, and is irrelevant to whether the methods (or the hypothetical method of analytical philosophers) of analytic philosophers ensure the truth of their philosophy.

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