But what was so different in Sunny’s CiF article and the above entry? Your entry Salman is a little more to the view that the occupation has done more to hinder the creation of an independent military and government I suppose. Though, If one supports the overthrow of the Taliban, realises that feminist enlightenment wouldn’t be an overnight phenomena, can see the shortcomings of foreign occupation but know it ever more problematic if Britain left now, then is Sunny’s point really so controversial, even from a leftwing standpoint?

On ways around the problem of where the British army stand the conclusions here were a little thin, but then we can all admit we “don’t have any easy answers”. So what possible solution could please both views (which in my mind more or less accounts for both level-headed views of Afghanistan, that is the question of whether we should’ve gone is irrelevent now in a sense, the question is what are we doing there, and how best to secure an independent military/govt).

For me in an entry I looked into the US military strategy of containment which is the position between “appeasement” (compromise through negotiation) and “rollback” (military force to destroy the enemy at its root), usually referred to when talking about US military strategy of carefully watching the expansion of the Soviet Union in the hope that this would relax its tendencies. The way in which this could be appropriated in Afghanistan is if we (owing to our proximity to the problem of the Taliban, they have their sites on Britian etc) limit our remit to overseeing the creation of an Afghani army/govt, and not try in any way to influence the creation of the infrastructure of those things.

The notion of invasion/propping up has not got a particularly good reputation, but I do however buy into Sunny’s notion that owing to Britain’s proximity to the danger of the Taliban, whether we liked the war or not, precludes our leaving now. Is containment a possible way in which to marry both the views of Sunny and the ones outlined in the entry above? Do correct me if I’m wrong.

I think one of the reasons we are doomed to fail is that the old realpolitik won’t work. We cannot divide and rule Afghanistan as we did in India; it is already divided and the Taleban are too strong and their recruitment drive too extensive.

Obviously, I’d much rather pull out from a position of strength than the so-so situation we find ourselves in at the moment to give the “liberal” Afghanis a chance, but I don’t think there is much we can do about that at the moment.