On Cornel West
Posted Under: Features, Identity, Minorities, Obama, Philosophy, Racism/Fascism, Society, US Politics
Guest post by Carl Packman
“You know, you already sent 21,000 troops. You might send 65,000 troops. That’s not a Peace Prize-acting activity.”
That’s what the lifelong civil rights activist and cautious Obama supporter, Dr Cornel West, had to say about the president’s surprise reception of the Nobel Peace Prize whilst promoting his new memoir this week.
Cornel Ronald West was born June 2nd 1953 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. He was in his teenage years when his activism started to develop, caught up in the middle of civil rights demonstrations which he participated in and helped to organise. His Harvard years would see him being taught by the libertarian influenced Robert Nozick, most famous for his work on epistemology and his contribution to the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. His militancy also started here, pushing for his political agendas to be met by the education hierarchies and creating a platform for his own “African, Christian and de-colonized outlooks.”
West’s academic life has been truly prolific since the completion of his doctoral thesis on Marxist ethics, which he earned from Princeton in 1980. He is currently the Class of 1943 Professor of Princeton University in the centre for African American Studies and the department of Religion. He holds 20 honorary degrees and is the author of 19 books that examine subjects as wide-ranging as racism, the Black Baptist Church, philosophy of religion and jazz. As well as writing books, he helped develop the philosophically charged storyline for the Wachowski brothers’ film The Matrix (1999) doubling up as the film’s official spokesperson and appearing in the final 2 films as Councillor West.
Unheard of for most intellectuals, when he is not working on anything academic or in film, West works on his musical career. He has recorded 3 music albums to date. His last album Never Forget: A Journey of Revelations featured some eminent names such as Prince, Outkast, Talib Kweli and KRS-ONE and took a stand against homophobic rap culture and lyrics that are considered derogatory to women.
Along with the recording of CD’s, advising Rev. Al Sharpton on his 2004 presidential campaign, and several lecture post cancellations, West drew some rather strident criticism from several other professors, who began questioning West’s intellectual rigour. One criticism in particular came from the Conservative professor of Comparative Literature, John McWhorter, who in April 2002 had written an impassioned article in the Wall Street Journal criticising West for replacing scholarly output with personal gain. McWhorter, who felt that it was inappropriate to keep West on as one of only 14 professors at Harvard, also speculated on West’s recent “decamp to Princeton” which began with a high-profile dispute with Lawrence H. Summers, the former president of Harvard.
The dispute started with Summers’ concern that West had started to neglect serious scholarly activity, and that West’s recent work had only consisted of edited volumes. Summers claims that West had cancelled three weeks worth of classes to endorse Bill Bradley’s presidential campaign, which led to West responding that he’d cancelled only one class to deliver an address at a “Harvard-sponsored conference on AIDS.” West felt that an academic should be specialised and faithful to her/his field but should not be limited to it, which encroached upon Summers’ very strict view of an academic’s duty and, according to West, is the totality of the disagreement.
But the disagreement went further still when West was taken ill with prostate cancer, he became disappointed that Summers had taken so long to send a get-well message (according to Pam Belluck and Jacques Steinberg for the New York Times in 2002) when by contrast new Princeton president, Shirley M. Tilghman “had called him almost weekly.” West ended up calling Summers the “Ariel Sharon of American Higher Education” and accepted an extended job offer made by Princeton, where he remains.

West’s public intellectual status began with the 1993 release of Race Matters, which has sold half a million copies to date. At the start of his book writing career, his political orientation was leaning more towards Marxism, with releases such as Prophecy Deliverance! (1982) and Prophetic Fragments (1988) that contended that class plays a far heavier significance than race in determining who is able to possess and who is lacking in societal power. But it was at the time of West’s release of The American Evasion of Philosophy (1989) where his intellectual attitudes began to modify, in which he took up more existential concerns.
For West, to be a left-winger today, one has to be concerned at the level of both the institutional and the existential. In an interview with Democracy Now, West claimed that the left today must target “the catastrophic … [so] often concealed in the deodorised and manicured discourses of the mainstream.”
West’s insistence on political existentialism emanates from his views on race. For him the birth of American racism and what he identified in Race Matters as black “existential angst” – which he believes still persists – originated in 1619, when America received shiploads of slaves. At this point, says West, America had both white and black slaves, and slavery itself was not yet “racialised”, but come 1621, white slaves had been named, whereas black slaves were identified simply by reference to their skin colour. West attributes this event as advancing the “black problematic of namelessness.” The black struggle that began with the abolitionist movement, all the way through to the civil rights movement, and to the present day is an expression of the fight against this “namelessness.” And it is an issue that West has always felt himself inextricably linked to.
So what symbolic event could ever take place to start averting Cornel West’s notion that the US is an institutionally racist nation? Surely the event of Barack Obama. West was supportive of Obama over the period of time in 2007 and early 2008 that he joined his campaign trail, albeit cautiously. West’s socialist tendencies meant that he took a step back in promoting Obama for his economic policies due to his propinquity to Robert Rubin, the attorney turned economic advisor to Bill Clinton responsible for brutal deregulation measures, and named the 8th most unethical person in business by Marketwatch earlier this year. But West considers the presidency to be symbolic on the psyche of black people and their struggles against what he considers to be America’s hitherto “white supremacy”.
Another public issue that West has recently immersed himself in is the debate over the term “post-racial America”. For West, the term’s recent importance designates a change in attitude that the white voter has regarding black candidates, what West calls “crossing the colour line”. Which, in his opinion, is obviously no bad thing, but it needn’t cross the line into “colour-blindness”. He goes on to say that the “black body” should be associated with “black humanity” and that the term “post-racial” is just an expression of “less racism”.
For justification, West notes that black voters have been voting on white candidates for years and, for them, it was not an expression of the post-racial, but looking for the best policies in a candidate, or, as West himself put it, apropos of the vote for a white mayor over the black candidate in Gary, Indiana, a vote based on “qualification as opposed to pigmentation”. And here, of course, he does have a major point; why should the issue of post-racial America emerge only now that there is a black president when black voters have always been looking beyond racial issues in their candidacy choice?
Whatever the outcome on the post-racial debate, West has told his supporters, and supporters of Obama in general, that the most important thing they can do is make their voices heard during his presidency years, and revitalise American democracy from its slumber. West has said that he aims to put pressure on Obama himself. In the interview with Democracy Now he stated clearly that he hoped Obama will be a “progressive Lincoln” so that West can be the “Frederick Douglass [abolitionist who held talks with Lincoln in 1863 on the treatment of black soldiers] to put pressure on him.”
It seems of great importance to listen to Cornel West’s highly enthused, energetic and celebrated voice, and I suspect it will be heard many more times to come in this new American era.
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Reader Comments
I realise this is irrelevant to the main point of the article, but surely Nozick’s more famous for Anarchy State and Utopia than for his epistemology? And I’m pretty sure the most well-known bit of his epistemology is the counterfactual theory of knowledge…[/philosophy pedant]
Owen, I won’t argue with that, but it does depend on what’s your main frame of interest, for political philosophers it’s your suggestion that rings familiar, for philosophers proper it’s mine.
Actually I meant for people in general – Anarchy State and Utopia got attention outside of philosophical circles, and as far as I know Philosophical Explanations didn’t.
Also, political philosophers aren’t “proper” philosophers? That there is fighting talk…
I’ll leave the fighting to someone else, I had meant that political philosophy is its own discipline, whereas philosophy proper is not political philosophy, only philosopher. I had not meant to say that political philosophers were not real philosophers, merely that they are not philosophers proper (and of course since political philosophy is its own discipline, that is not in any way a slur).
It’s OK, I wasn’t being entirely serious. I’d definitely disagree about political philosophy being a separate discipline from the rest of philosophy though.
Oh come on! Stop being so bloody polite, both of you! I was looking forward to fisticuffs…
*Punches Salman*
Well, you did ask…
Oh I am sorry Salman, what’s that old faux saying meek and rubbish…
Owen, really now, there is philosophy that is too speculative to be called politically committed.
And I wish you’d told me you were’t being entirely serious, I’ve changed the locks on the doors now…
Eh, I don’t blame you for being cautious. I can be pretty intimidating when I put my mind to it. (Yep, all nine stone and five foot seven of me – truly terrifying…)
How does the fact that some philosophy is too speculative to be called political philosophy entail that political philosophy isn’t proper philosophy? I’m confused.
I tend to associate Nozick with Anarchy, State and Utopia (though yes, philosophers proper will value his work on epistemology, whereas political theorits may dwell more on the political stuff). Anyway, I’m not really sure why political philosophy should be seen as a different body of concerns to the rest of philosophy’s concerns. I’m also not sure what you speak of when you mention “philosophy that’s too speculative to be called politically committed”.
oooo I’ve opened something up here haven’t I. Political philosophy is a branch of philosophy, but when I talk of philosophy proper, I mean to say philosophy specifically, not branches of philosophy for example political philosophy. There are, within philosophy, categories which are purely speculative, which caused Marx to opine that famous quip about masturbation being to sex what philosophy is to real life. This type of philosophy is the type which cannot be of any real help to the political sciences. I’m sure its slightly personal which philosophy fits into this category of speculative, but for me Cartesian philosophy is this, not to mention much other idealist philosophies, though not all of them (Hobbes, Hegel being two exceptions I can think of right now).
Philosophy proper is not a slur, I just mean it as the discipline in-itself, not one of many of its derivatives, such as political philosophy.
Oh right, I understand what you’re saying now, but now I think I also disagree. It’s possible we may have different concepts of what philosophy is. I tend to think, in agreement with philosophers of the analytic tradition, that there is no ‘purely philosophical’ subject matter. Philosophy being, to my mind, a mode of inquiry relying on reason and first principles, rather than being ‘about’ specific concerns. An activity rather than a subject, if you will. As such, I have difficuty seeing philosophy as having categories that have any taxanomical significance other than that of conveniently dividing intellectual labour. Thus, the labels we give to various strands of philosophical inquiry — moral, political, existential — are merely convenient ways of dividing the labour among philosophers, of investigating various epistemological concerns. The division of philosophy into these branches is therefore, I’d argue, artificial, if useful.
I also wonder whether we should be so quick to reject what you refer to as speculative philosophy (by which I assume you mean idealist philosophy, and metaphysics). I think that even though some philosophical issues and questions look like head-wanking, *good* philosophical inquiry is useful for the following reasons:
1) Conclusions we arrive at in ’speculative’ philosophy inform our reasoning about other, real-life concerns. So, for example, brains-in-vats thought experiments may give illuminating insights into, say, understanding the minds of others, and thus giving us useful things to consider when communicating thoughts to others.
2) Speculative moral or political philosophy may also give us normative aspirations. So, it is true that (using Nozick as an example) a particular theory of justice or the ideal society or the Good Life may serve little immediate purpose, but may indeed set a normative aspiration for politicians and individuals. The influence of Hayek (and Nozick) on the new right, for example, is pretty evident I think.
3) Also, do you not think that some useless-seeming thought experiments and philosophical bodies of thought, may serve to test the implications of believing something? In other words, because we act on our beliefs, and desire clarity in our beliefs, it seems useful to me to test the implications of beliefs through such speculative philosophising.
4) Even philosophers I’m not crazy about (Hegel and Heidegger for example — I’m not keen on either their ideas or their philosophic methods), though their philosophy may not ultimately be getting at any practical ‘truth’, give us useful ways of looking at the world. I’m a metaphysical nihilist and think that in the absence of any real metaphysical ‘things’ we’re at a most disheartening dead end when it comes to making sense of experience. As such, certain fictions and asbtractions may give us some guidance in terms of how best to make sense of an otherwise inchoate mass of data and experience. In this respect, speculative philosophy has the effect of organising experience and data into usably coherent entities. Even if it is just stuff of the mind.
Yet I do share your suspicion of some kinds of philosophising: much of what is labelled philosophy is of questionable worth as a contribution to reason-based inquiry. I’m generally spusicious of the extravagant theories-of-everything (and anything!) that continental philosophy tends to aspire to (ok that’s an exaggeration and maybe a caraicature of Cont. Phil., but I hope you get my drift). I hope I haven’t misstated your position in making these observations.
You have given me a lot to swallow there Tendai, much of which I think could be re-written into a perfectly good blog post, maybe even here. I feel like we have taken the finer points a little too far, but as we are on the subject, I think there is a time for the speculative philosophy which we are talking about, and I can see their contribution to real life. Your definitions seem to be totally correct, although a distinction should be made (and, I repeat, not to belittle any strand of philosophy) between the philosophies which give us first-hand answers into real-life, such as is A.C. Grayling’s job in this country for example, who often lectures on national repsonsibility, market responsibility, ethics and war, that sort of thing, and philosophies that emanate from subjective matters and so on, continental philosophy, though not limited to this.
Though there is no distinction between importance of head-wanking and ethics based philosophies, if those head-wanking philosophies do answer legitimate questions as well, there is a distinction in what strand of philosophy they emerge from. The obvious way, for me at least, to distinguish these two strands is by referring one to philosophy, and the other to political philosophy. There may be problems with the terminology – that surely is not my fault – but these categorical distinctions seem to me pretty tight.
“You have given me a lot to swallow there Tendai”
- That’s what she said!
Wey-heyyyyyyyyyyyyy