Comments on: An Interview with Ted Honderich http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/ What Is The Third Estate? Everything. What Has It Been Until Now In The Political Order? Nothing. What Does It Want To Be? Something. Wed, 08 Feb 2012 20:19:31 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1.1 By: Salman Shaheen http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5191 Salman Shaheen Sun, 08 Nov 2009 15:12:23 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5191 Don't know why it keeps eating your comments Tendai, you're the only person it seems to happen to. Maybe try using a different email address? Don’t know why it keeps eating your comments Tendai, you’re the only person it seems to happen to. Maybe try using a different email address?

]]> By: Tendai http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5190 Tendai Sun, 08 Nov 2009 14:52:16 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5190 Thing ate my comment. I'd said re. the "clean hands thing", to be morally justified in using violence, you should be above moral reproach. Palestine's leaders are not. You can't just escalate a situation even if you're partly responsible for it. Thing ate my comment. I’d said re. the “clean hands thing”, to be morally justified in using violence, you should be above moral reproach. Palestine’s leaders are not. You can’t just escalate a situation even if you’re partly responsible for it.

]]> By: Tendai http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5189 Tendai Sun, 08 Nov 2009 14:47:36 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5189 >>>Though, on re-reading your points, what on earth do you mean by “Have they come to the fight with clean hands (no they haven’t)?” Why is this relevant, and whose hands do you mean?<<< If you're going to resort to violence, you have to yourself be above moral reproach. The Palestinian leaders are not. Surely that's not controversial? >>>Though, on re-reading your points, what on earth do you mean by “Have they come to the fight with clean hands (no they haven’t)?” Why is this relevant, and whose hands do you mean?<<<
If you're going to resort to violence, you have to yourself be above moral reproach. The Palestinian leaders are not. Surely that's not controversial?

]]> By: Tendai http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5188 Tendai Sun, 08 Nov 2009 14:44:58 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5188 Dan, I wouldn't quite say I was saying "you can simply never reject moral arguments". Rather, I'm saying you can't *ignore* an objection that's clearly true...treat it like it doesn't exist (e.g. Tendai doesn't like being tortured -- it remains true whatever one's system of morality). Can we rationally ignore this in decidng how to treat me? * It is very probably the case that we have differing concepts of morality. It's not my place to force mine down anyone else's throat. But the central tension seems to be whether morality is just a way of justifying what you feel like doing, or if it's more than that. I think it's more than that. When I speak of incommensurability etc, sure, they come from a particular tradition, but I think we can use them as tools without committing to the said traditions. When I use those terms, then, I only use them to highlight "at least one possible objection" to the statement being questioned. It's not really a bag of beliefs but a microscope; a style of argument rather than a list of truths. * My response no doubt was as much to you and Lorna as to Honderich. I'd have to re-read Honderich and his critics (and in more detail) to deal with his arguments thoroughly, and see if his defences could succeed. But, the argument as put above, was what I was intending to address. * Sure, these questions are hard to resolve because of the various different notions of morality. But wouldn't you agree that this doesn't make it impossible to take objections seriously -- to "speak" to the objections rather than leaving it at an impasse of relativism? Now, of course I'm not claiming my private moral positions have God's Authority. But I can probably have private moral positions, and still be able to rationally account for the preferences of another human being. This , to my mind, makes such a minimal demand on the beliefs of others, that it's not a bad way to start talking about moral questions. I don't think you'd have to abandon your beliefs or commit to new ones. Anyway a lot has been said here, and I don't want waste space. Dan,
I wouldn’t quite say I was saying “you can simply never reject moral arguments”. Rather, I’m saying you can’t *ignore* an objection that’s clearly true…treat it like it doesn’t exist (e.g. Tendai doesn’t like being tortured — it remains true whatever one’s system of morality). Can we rationally ignore this in decidng how to treat me?
*
It is very probably the case that we have differing concepts of morality. It’s not my place to force mine down anyone else’s throat. But the central tension seems to be whether morality is just a way of justifying what you feel like doing, or if it’s more than that. I think it’s more than that. When I speak of incommensurability etc, sure, they come from a particular tradition, but I think we can use them as tools without committing to the said traditions. When I use those terms, then, I only use them to highlight “at least one possible objection” to the statement being questioned. It’s not really a bag of beliefs but a microscope; a style of argument rather than a list of truths.
*
My response no doubt was as much to you and Lorna as to Honderich. I’d have to re-read Honderich and his critics (and in more detail) to deal with his arguments thoroughly, and see if his defences could succeed. But, the argument as put above, was what I was intending to address.
*
Sure, these questions are hard to resolve because of the various different notions of morality. But wouldn’t you agree that this doesn’t make it impossible to take objections seriously — to “speak” to the objections rather than leaving it at an impasse of relativism? Now, of course I’m not claiming my private moral positions have God’s Authority. But I can probably have private moral positions, and still be able to rationally account for the preferences of another human being. This , to my mind, makes such a minimal demand on the beliefs of others, that it’s not a bad way to start talking about moral questions. I don’t think you’d have to abandon your beliefs or commit to new ones. Anyway a lot has been said here, and I don’t want waste space.

]]> By: Dan http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5186 Dan Sun, 08 Nov 2009 13:54:31 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5186 Though, on re-reading your points, what on earth do you mean by "Have they come to the fight with clean hands (no they haven’t)?" Why is this relevant, and whose hands do you mean? Though, on re-reading your points, what on earth do you mean by “Have they come to the fight with clean hands (no they haven’t)?” Why is this relevant, and whose hands do you mean?

]]> By: Dan http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5185 Dan Sun, 08 Nov 2009 13:47:55 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5185 But Tendai that simply won't do. If you cannot reject arguments you find unconvinving, weak and problematic then moral discourse truly is impossible. Whether or not your morals constitute a system, you have shown through the course of this commentary, via references to 'commensurability', 'people as means' and 'veil of ignorance' that you have a certain set of ethical presuppositions, drawn from a fairly particular tradition. This is fine. Finally, on those five points, they seem reasonable criteria. Honderich has or could offer an answer to all five. Is your criticism merely that he is wrong in these answers? If so, again that is fair enough, but you implied your criticism is deeper. But Tendai that simply won’t do. If you cannot reject arguments you find unconvinving, weak and problematic then moral discourse truly is impossible.
Whether or not your morals constitute a system, you have shown through the course of this commentary, via references to ‘commensurability’, ‘people as means’ and ‘veil of ignorance’ that you have a certain set of ethical presuppositions, drawn from a fairly particular tradition. This is fine.
Finally, on those five points, they seem reasonable criteria. Honderich has or could offer an answer to all five. Is your criticism merely that he is wrong in these answers? If so, again that is fair enough, but you implied your criticism is deeper.

]]> By: Tendai http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5184 Tendai Sun, 08 Nov 2009 13:25:37 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5184 Dan, I'm afraid the comments system has hopelessly disfigured my argument, so I won't revisit it point for point, and will summarise instead. I apologise that I no longer clearly remember what the logical fallacy was: I think you took me to be saying that "if you break moral imperatives you are a ultilitarian", and you rightly considered this to be fallacious. But I don't think that's what I was saying: I understood myself to be saying "Only utilitarianism would justify ignoring a moral imperative for the sake of expedience [rather than necessity]". And that, I identified as the issue of chief concern to me in the position here. As to whether or not moral imperatives are exceptionless, that will require a long discussion on metaethics, which would probably be better left for other places (I don't think they are though -- and I imagined your arguments were centrally supported by that premise) It is, however, reasonably uncontroversial that sometimes a wrong act can be the right thing to do: the question is *when*, and why you justify drawing the line at a particular point, and not higher or lower (in other words, it can lead to moral arbitrariness). That's what I meant when i spoke of thresholds. * Lying would be the right thing to do if it prevents a death. Would it be the right thing to do if it gets me out of trouble? Obviously not. That's just expedience. My whole problem with the position taken on terrorism here is that I can't see how it differs from mere expedience. And here's why: 1) Moral arbitrariness: How desparate does a situation have to be to warrant terrorism (i.e. using an unsuspecting other purely as a means to an end, by taking their life or injuring them)? Would a vision of a Marxist society be a good enough reason? Or would the abolition of Parliament be? Or something even more desparate? How do you draw the line and how do you justify it other than by ideological biases? 2) Moral necessity (as opposed to utility) as a justification: Even with that unresolved, one must wonder how desparate does the plight of the Palestinians have to be to warrant terrorism? Do they have other options to mitigate their plight before resorting to terrorism (yes they do)? Have they come to the fight with clean hands (no they haven't)? 3) Rationality: Is terrorism likely to achieve the goals of the Palestinians? Almost certainly not. Terrorism, like powercuts, is something that a population can become urprisingly resillient to, and capable of containing (the Palestinian Wall and the blockade of Gaza are examples of why terrorism here is self-defeating). 4) Clarity of scenarios: Finally, to say that "people have a right to resort to armed resistance" is obviously true as a general statement. But that's not the same as saying people have a right to terrorism, if only because the two types of armed action are not identical -- both includes elements that are not necessary to the nature of the other. 5) Moral exceptions: Of course there are situations when terrorism could well be justified. I just don't see this as one of them. * Your comments on the veil of ignorance are true to an extent. But I think your objection is a reductio. Torture is commonly discussed in that context: substitute terrorism for torture -- both acts that use another purely as a means to an end, under barbaric conditions -- and I think the thought argument still works. * To conclude, I really don't think simply rejecting (ignoring?) a moral argument is a useful option for people who take moral reasoning seriously. That's exactly what I meant when I said you can't "talk over" a valid objection. Of course a person doesn't have to care, but now we've gone from moral exceptions to mere nihilism. I personally don't have a 'system' of morality -- it's the worst way to understand morality. I limit my moral reasoning to trying to speak to all known objections to my proposed course of action, withdrawing that action if I am unable to address the objections strongly enough. Dan,
I’m afraid the comments system has hopelessly disfigured my argument, so I won’t revisit it point for point, and will summarise instead. I apologise that I no longer clearly remember what the logical fallacy was: I think you took me to be saying that “if you break moral imperatives you are a ultilitarian”, and you rightly considered this to be fallacious. But I don’t think that’s what I was saying: I understood myself to be saying “Only utilitarianism would justify ignoring a moral imperative for the sake of expedience [rather than necessity]“. And that, I identified as the issue of chief concern to me in the position here. As to whether or not moral imperatives are exceptionless, that will require a long discussion on metaethics, which would probably be better left for other places (I don’t think they are though — and I imagined your arguments were centrally supported by that premise) It is, however, reasonably uncontroversial that sometimes a wrong act can be the right thing to do: the question is *when*, and why you justify drawing the line at a particular point, and not higher or lower (in other words, it can lead to moral arbitrariness). That’s what I meant when i spoke of thresholds.
*
Lying would be the right thing to do if it prevents a death. Would it be the right thing to do if it gets me out of trouble? Obviously not. That’s just expedience. My whole problem with the position taken on terrorism here is that I can’t see how it differs from mere expedience. And here’s why:
1) Moral arbitrariness: How desparate does a situation have to be to warrant terrorism (i.e. using an unsuspecting other purely as a means to an end, by taking their life or injuring them)? Would a vision of a Marxist society be a good enough reason? Or would the abolition of Parliament be? Or something even more desparate? How do you draw the line and how do you justify it other than by ideological biases?
2) Moral necessity (as opposed to utility) as a justification: Even with that unresolved, one must wonder how desparate does the plight of the Palestinians have to be to warrant terrorism? Do they have other options to mitigate their plight before resorting to terrorism (yes they do)? Have they come to the fight with clean hands (no they haven’t)?
3) Rationality: Is terrorism likely to achieve the goals of the Palestinians? Almost certainly not. Terrorism, like powercuts, is something that a population can become urprisingly resillient to, and capable of containing (the Palestinian Wall and the blockade of Gaza are examples of why terrorism here is self-defeating).
4) Clarity of scenarios: Finally, to say that “people have a right to resort to armed resistance” is obviously true as a general statement. But that’s not the same as saying people have a right to terrorism, if only because the two types of armed action are not identical — both includes elements that are not necessary to the nature of the other.
5) Moral exceptions: Of course there are situations when terrorism could well be justified. I just don’t see this as one of them.
*
Your comments on the veil of ignorance are true to an extent. But I think your objection is a reductio. Torture is commonly discussed in that context: substitute terrorism for torture — both acts that use another purely as a means to an end, under barbaric conditions — and I think the thought argument still works.
*
To conclude, I really don’t think simply rejecting (ignoring?) a moral argument is a useful option for people who take moral reasoning seriously. That’s exactly what I meant when I said you can’t “talk over” a valid objection. Of course a person doesn’t have to care, but now we’ve gone from moral exceptions to mere nihilism. I personally don’t have a ‘system’ of morality — it’s the worst way to understand morality. I limit my moral reasoning to trying to speak to all known objections to my proposed course of action, withdrawing that action if I am unable to address the objections strongly enough.

]]> By: Dan http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5182 Dan Sun, 08 Nov 2009 12:12:35 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5182 On the logical fallacy claim. It is not that moral judgements are exceptionless (I actually think at base they probably are). It is that even a wrong act can be the right thing to do and still be wrong. This is not universally accepted, but is a fairly common way of thinking about morality. On the logical fallacy claim. It is not that moral judgements are exceptionless (I actually think at base they probably are). It is that even a wrong act can be the right thing to do and still be wrong. This is not universally accepted, but is a fairly common way of thinking about morality.

]]> By: Dan http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5181 Dan Sun, 08 Nov 2009 12:10:46 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5181 Sorry it's taken a while for me to respond, Tendai. I don't see why justifying Palestinian terrorism has to "talk over (or excuse), rather than justify" objections. Can't it just reject them? If you come up with a complicated ethical system which tells me it is wrong to go to Tesco today, can't I reject it on the basis of disagreement with your system? This may or may not involve talking over, but it is a perfectly legitimate argumentative strategy. Now, I think it's clear that you are committed to ethical claims that both Lorna and I find problematic. Fair enough. You also seem to be a fan of "veil of ignorance" type metaethics. But to say we would not choose terrorism behind a veil of ignorance really does make no sense, for Rawls at least. What we are supposed to choose behind the veil of ignorance is the distribution of primary goods in the basic structure of society. If we use it to proscribe certain actions it leads to moral paralysis. Choosing Terrorism, like choosing war, marriage, retirement and Coca-Cola is done in highly specific, factually rich scenarios, and could not be otherwise. Sorry it’s taken a while for me to respond, Tendai. I don’t see why justifying Palestinian terrorism has to “talk over (or excuse), rather than justify” objections. Can’t it just reject them? If you come up with a complicated ethical system which tells me it is wrong to go to Tesco today, can’t I reject it on the basis of disagreement with your system? This may or may not involve talking over, but it is a perfectly legitimate argumentative strategy.

Now, I think it’s clear that you are committed to ethical claims that both Lorna and I find problematic. Fair enough. You also seem to be a fan of “veil of ignorance” type metaethics. But to say we would not choose terrorism behind a veil of ignorance really does make no sense, for Rawls at least. What we are supposed to choose behind the veil of ignorance is the distribution of primary goods in the basic structure of society. If we use it to proscribe certain actions it leads to moral paralysis. Choosing Terrorism, like choosing war, marriage, retirement and Coca-Cola is done in highly specific, factually rich scenarios, and could not be otherwise.

]]> By: Salman Shaheen http://thethirdestate.net/2009/11/an-interview-with-ted-honderich/comment-page-1/#comment-5121 Salman Shaheen Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:48:25 +0000 http://thethirdestate.net/?p=2775#comment-5121 I'm not quite sure why, but for some reason Tendai a fair few of your comments are getting blocked by our spam filter. I've restored them now, so hopefully the system will recognise you're not a spammer, but if it happens again let me know. I’m not quite sure why, but for some reason Tendai a fair few of your comments are getting blocked by our spam filter. I’ve restored them now, so hopefully the system will recognise you’re not a spammer, but if it happens again let me know.

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