Guest post by Kamaljeet Gill

I recently attended a book launch for a work called The Power of Numbers, why Europe needs to have more Children by Richard Ehrman. The event was organised by Policy Connect, a think tank that positions itself as somewhat the progressive edge of the Conservative Party (meaningless as that phrase may be). The launch was attended by David Willets, Shadow Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills. Willets stated that he had been fascinated by demographics since adolescence because it seemed to him to offer “an alternative explanatory discipline to Marxism”. Willets felt that demographics could be applied to economics, politics and history in the same manner that Marxists looked to the means of production. This led me to wonder if there was something intrinsic in the nature of demographics that meant it was particularly suited to adoption by the right.

I feel the answer to this question leads us on to some a valuable discussion of the nature of left- and right-wing discourse and the extent to which we should be prepared to cede the discussion of certain issues to the right. Central to the discussion of demographics in this context is the work of a demographer called Castles about whom I will talk more later. Firstly it is worth making a clarification at this stage; to a large extent whether an intellectual discipline, image, icon, word or flag is left- or right-wing depends on who uses it and how. It is also, of course, possible to conduct an analysis of the means of production from a right-wing perspective; arguably in some of his work on Empire the historian Niall Ferguson has done precisely this. Nonetheless, few would disagree that the way a symbol, discourse or icon has been used in the past has a sizeable impact on the way it will be received in the future, and this must impact on how it can be used. No matter how many temples it appears on in Asia, the swastika has unavoidable connotations in Europe and those must be engaged with by anyone hoping to use it.

With this in mind I will move on to the next point of clarification, in talking about demography I am really focussing upon one particular area of demographic study more than the others. That is the study of fertility rather than the focus on mortality rates, life-expectancy etc. I feel that it is this area appears most susceptible to cooption by the right.

Demographic analysis concerns itself with what might be called the “facts” (in itself a loaded term) of a given population. At least at the point of study these facts present themselves as immutable. A given population either has a birth-rate of 1.65 children per woman or it does not. Any further debate will tend to move onto issues of social policy, economics and a thousand other issues upon which demographics can have a bearing. It is the impression of hardnosed reality which demographics gives to its pronouncements which I feel often enables it to sit well within a right-wing discourse. A lot of the right’s appeal, particularly in Britain and particularly post-Thatcher is a hardnosed realism, “this is the way things are” particularly in regard to social inequalities there are exceptions and complications of course, however much of the right’s ideology remains based on the concept certain inequalities and discrepancies are intrinsic and that therefore individual self-interest is the soundest basis upon which to organise society. It is not difficult to see how a demographic analysis of birth-rate could be deployed to defend such a proposition.

The spectre of Malthus is visible in much of this. In some sense demographics used in this manner could be posited as the descendant of Malthus in opposition to the numerous intellectual descendants of Marx. The fundamental issue here is that demography deals in issues that the left often does not feel as comfortable with. Issues such as fertility are, at base (and forgive me for stating the blindingly obvious) issues of who can have children. Why would the left be uncomfortable with this issue? Once again it comes down to the idea of fixed and immutable differences either between peoples, classes or genders. Aside from far right groups like the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and BJP in India implying that differentials in fertility threaten to turn India into a Muslim nation; and fascist regimes urging citizens to have more children to make the fatherland strong, there is the intrinsic issue of gender difference, something with which the right is far more comfortable than the left. It is relatively uncontroversial to state that despite the flexible nature of gender as a construct, it remains only women who bear children. It sits far more easily within a right-wing discourse on the importance of family values and traditional gender roles, therefore, to discuss the importance of high fertility because one can very easily (though I would say illegitimately) move that discussion on to the duty of women to have more children as opposed to stay in employment for instance.

Once again it seems uncontroversial to claim that one of the biggest boons in terms of feminism and women’s rights in the last fifty years was advances in reproductive freedom brought about by developments in contraceptive technologies, most notably the pill. It is also a pretty uncontroversial statement that the combination of the entry of women into the workplace which both coincided with and helped to encourage the take up of the contraceptive pill resulted in a steep decline in fertility during the 1960s and ’70s as fertility levels fell dramatically in UK, USA and across Europe.

This process was did not occur simultaneously across all nations however, and this is where the work of Castles comes in. Castles found that the countries in which this decline occurred first were those of the North and West of Europe; countries which were more accepting of divorce, single mothers, cohabitation and female employment as well as paternity leave, childcare and state support for working parents. By contrast, countries in the South and East of Europe, often ones where the Catholic Church maintained a hegemonic position, which had a far more patriarchal social value system, and were far less accepting of the above practices maintained higher fertility rates into the late 1970’s and 80’s. After this point they underwent a similar decline to those of Northern and Western Europe. Not only did they follow the example of nations like Sweden and the UK, but while these Northern nations subsequently saw a return to higher levels of fertility (though not to the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman), the Southern and Central European nations have maintained remarkably low levels of fertility to this day. Castles theorised that the decline in fertility was a product of the coincidence of developments in contraception and the entry of women into the workforce, and that a quicker recovery was a product of women facing a less stark choice between having children and a career. In the more traditional societies however, support for managing children and work was lacking; female employment is an inevitable product of a post-industrial society and so faced with this stark choice far more women in these nations choose not to have children.

And this is where Willets and those at Policy Exchange ran into difficulty. Comfortable with it or not, everyone has to accept that demographics has a great impact upon the welfare of nations, as the looming pensions crises looks set to prove. However, looking at Castles’ work, the solution is not one that the traditional right is comfortable with. Instead it is left-wing policies of nations like Sweden and Iceland, tolerance of divorce, state support for single parents, childcare, paternity leave and so on. This is a debate that will need to be had in the future, and while it may seem uncomfortable, it is not only advisable but vital that we engage with the right on their own terms on this one, and not let them co-opt the discipline as the natural property of the Conservative Party.

It was quietly announced last week that the Minister for Culture, Andy Burnham MP, is to uphold English Heritage’s initial recommendation that the Robin Hood Gardens estate in Poplar, East London, should not be listed.

Robin Hood Gardens means little to those who don’t live there and is, alas, held in even less regard by those who do.  As a community organiser in East London, my first week on the job took me back to the corner of Poplar High Street and Robin Hood Lane, where the estate now stands, in an attempt to solicit and then organise residents’ concerns over its coming foreclosure.  “Them fuckin’ pricks who built it wanna try n live hear mate,” I remember one man saying to me.  Another gentleman, a Somali man of very little English, simply gave me a thumbs down.

I remember being aghast at that the time that the architectural magazine Building Design was launching a campaign to save such a monstrosity.  As a gap year student trying to reconcile my youth, my politics and my libido in Havana, I too had had the dubious pleasure of once living in a great Stalinist concrete slab.  I remember sitting there one evening, 30°C of glorious sunshine, a vi ew golden tobacco fields below, and thinking… what a pile of shit.  What kind of ideology builds this?   The answer: a noble one.

Completed in 1972, Robin Hood Gardens was supposed to be to the crown jewel in the East End’s post-war reconstruction.  Lacking both the necessary resources and the cultural assurance to justify the use of its traditional forms, British architecture had embarked upon a sociological crusade following the New Towns Act of 1946 – a mood paralleled across the formation of welfare state, with similar acts elsewhere such the Education Act of 1944.  Britain was not only to be rebuilt – it was to be reconceived.  And along with the nearby Balfron Tower and Carradale House, both of which had just been completed, architects Alison and Peter Smithson sought to build Britain’s answer to Le Corbusier’s Unité d’Habitation in Marseille.  Honest, functional, rational: its ‘streets in the sky’ where to engineer in Britain a materialist realisation of the Russian constructivists abstract and then betrayed dreams. 

Forty-five years later and Robin Hood Gardens has failed.  Please debate any of the above, but it has failed.  For all the principled thought and design, it is simply not fit for purpose.  And although Tory spending cuts, right-to-buy and ALMOs are no doubt partially to blame, you cannot dare venture, as the Smithson’s contemporary Erno Goldfinger once did, “I built skyscrapers for people to live in there and now they messed them up- disgusting.”

I started by saying ‘took me back’ to the corner of Poplar High Street and Robin Hood Lane – truth be told, I think I had only been there once before.  It was to survey what is now just a hollowed out mess adjacent to the municipal car park.  There, amongst some grit and a rather sorry attempt at a tree, still stands the visible the remnants of what was once ‘The White Hart’ pub.  It was here that my father and his family lived between 1964-1967- one of four or five pubs owned at one time or another by my Grandad Sid and my Great Uncle Ern around the East India Docks.  It was demolished to make way for the new estate.

And so, it is with a heavy heart and a certain reluctance that I will soon welcome the end of part of the East End’s, and my family’s, post-war history.  Over the past few years, I have come to love and hate Robin Hood Gardens in equal measure.  What is undoubtedly so alluring about these buildings is that they attempt to conceive of world which we have not yet built, and then look to transport us there.  They are truly rationalist and revolutionary – built in the belief that social architects can turn over a clean page, start afresh, and then conceive of and construct something better out of the ruins of what went before.  But unfortunately, like much preplanned revolutionary wholesale change before it, it could not continue to inflict its will upon a people forever.  Houses, like socialism, must be built from the bottom up.